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Get Clean or Get Out:
Landlords Drug-Testing Tenants
David Lang*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 states, “It is the declared policy
of the United States Government to create a Drug-Free America by
1995.”1 Analysis of the Status Report on Missouri’s Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Problems reveals, however, that this country still suffers
from a drug abuse problem.2 The number of drug-related crimes
committed annually is even more alarming than the number of drug
users.3 Although these crimes are not limited to a particular type of
neighborhood, congressional findings reveal that drug-related crimes
pervade low-income housing.4
Community leaders, frustrated by the inability to control drug use
through traditional law enforcement efforts, have begun to focus their
attention on “absentee landlord[s],” stating that landlords may be held
liable for criminal activities that occur on their properties.5 Courts
* J.D. 2000, B.S.B.A. 1996, Washington University. The author would like to thank
Carl and Gail Lang, Agelo Reppas, and Cherie Faulkner for their invaluable comments and
suggestions on various aspects of this Note.
1. Abuse Act of 1988 Pub. L. 100-690, Title V, § 5251, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4309.
2. Randall C. Smith, Christie J. Lundy, & Michael S. Givel, STATUS REPORT ON
MISSOURI’S ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE PROBLEMS (Mo. Dept. of Mental Health/Division of
Alcohol and Drug Abuse) (4th ed. 1998). This report presents substance abuse data at the
national, state, regional, county, and at some city levels. The county data includes information
on driving while intoxicated, arrests, types of reported drug problems, health statistics of
abusers, and other related information.
3. Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 11901(2)-(3) (1994). “Congress finds that . . . public and other federally
assisted low-income housing in many areas suffers from rampant drug-related crime . . . [and
that] drug dealers are increasingly imposing a reign of terror on public and other federally
assisted low-income housing tenants.” Id.
5. Lawrence Shoffner & George Sumnik, Controlling Drug-Related Activity in
Residential Leaseholds, 70 MICH. B.J. 168, 168 (1991). See, e.g., Landowners’ Liability for
Criminal Acts Committed by Third Parties: Recent Developments, 10 NO. 1 VERDICTS,
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have held landlords liable for damages to crime victims upon a
finding that either the condition of the landlord’s property contributed
to the crime, or there was a failure to warn the victim of the risk of
crime.6 Courts also use public nuisance statutes to hold landlords
liable for the illegal acts of their tenants.7 These laws may require a
landlord to pay fines, evict tenants, or even close the property for up
to one year.8
Forfeiture statutes are even worse than nuisance statutes for
landlords and building owners.9 Under these statutes the illegal
activities of a tenant create the risk of civil forfeiture of the landlord’s
property.10 For example, even if law enforcement officials find only
one tenant using drugs illegally in an isolated part of a building, they
SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS, Jan. 1990, at 2 (discussing the varying degrees of liability which
different types of landowners face).
6. B. A. Glesner, Landlords As Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing
Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 708 (1992).
7. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.01 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.3820 (West 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-3-101 (1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 47-1-1 (1998). See also 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances
§§ 229-232 (1989). A landlord may also be liable for a tenant’s conduct in a private nuisance
action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 357-58, 837 (1977).
8. Id.
9. At the federal level section 881 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 addresses the forfeiture of property used in connection with illegal drugs.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(9) (1997). At the state level the structure of forfeiture statutes follows the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970. Id.
10. A criminal conviction of the tenant or landlord is not necessary to invoke a civil
forfeiture action. See United States v. $152,160.00 United States Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354,
356, 358 (D. Colo. 1988) (holding that a criminal indictment is not necessary to commence a
civil forfeiture hearing). In a civil forfeiture action, the government need only show probable
cause existed to link the property to drugs. See United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d
625, 628 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that under § 881(a)(6) “the United States must establish
probable cause to believe that a substantial connection exists between the property to be
forfeited and an illegal exchange of a controlled substance . . . the government is not required to
show that the property is owned by a drug trafficker, but rather that it has a substantial
connection to a drug transaction”) (internal citation omitted); See also United States v. Four
Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1056 (1986). Thereafter, the burden shifts to the landlord to prove either that the property
was not used to facilitate a drug violation or that the tenant’s illegal use was without the
landlord’s knowledge or consent. See United States v. 5 Bell Rock Road, 896 F.2d 605, 610-12
(1st Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted) (upholding summary judgment for government
because landowners did not meet their burden); United States v. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d
213, 216 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that once the government shows probable cause, “the burden
then shifts to the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not
subject to forfeiture”) (internal citations omitted).
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may seize the entire building.11
Therefore, the question is whether landlords must police their
tenants to ensure that drug related problems do not exist on their
property. An expectation exists that landlords should know what
occurs on their property and exercise control over it.12 Of course,
meeting this expectation is not easy given that laws protect tenants’
privacy and enjoyment of their homes from landlord interference.13 In
order to maintain control over property without infringing on tenants’
rights, landlords need better screening techniques to keep out
troublesome tenants.14 For this reason landlords should be able to
impose drug testing on tenants as a precondition of entering into a
lease agreement.
Part II of this Note provides a background of drug testing in
housing situations and identifies current laws and statutes that deal
with screening tenants and discrimination. Part III discusses the
Supreme Court’s views on suspicionless drug testing. Part IV applies
the Supreme Court’s views on suspicionless drug testing to the
housing situation and discusses the constitutionality of drug testing
tenants. Part V outlines considerations and problems that may arise
when the landlords decide to implement a drug testing program.
II. THE PRESENT STATE OF DRUG TESTING IN HOUSING AND ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS
The use of drug tests in the United States is increasing because the
testing methods are becoming less expensive and more reliable.15
11. United States v. 141st Street, 911 F.2d 870, 880 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1109 (1991) (holding that an entire parcel of land may be subject to forfeiture even if only part
of it is directly connected to drug activity); United States v. 16 Clinton Street, 730 F. Supp.
1265, 1267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that the police could seize an entire building after a
drug arrest occurred on the first floor).
12. Shoffner & Sumnik, supra note 5, at 168.
13. Id.
14. Tenant screening agencies are available to landlords but are controversial and often
ineffective. For a discussion on Tenant Screening Agencies, see David J. D’Urso, Tenant
Screening Agencies: Implications For Landlords And Tenants, 26 REAL EST. L.J. 44 (1997).
15. It is important to note that although the testing methods are becoming more reliable,
the accuracy may not improve due to intense competition and laboratory imperfections. See
infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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Drug testing is already imposed on employees in the workplace,16
athletes in schools,17 and candidates for public programs.18
Additionally, landlords are beginning to require that tenants submit to
drug testing as a condition of entering into a lease.19
Although current laws do not expressly forbid landlords from drug
testing tenants, a number of acts and statutes regulate what landlords
may require of their tenants. These acts regulate inquiries made of
drug users and curtail discrimination against people with
disabilities.20
16. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1989) (discussing
how the Federal Railroad Administration requires railroads to conduct blood and urine tests of
covered employees following certain major train accidents or incidents); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989) (stating that the United States
Customs Service implemented a program mandating urinalysis tests for Service employees
seeking placement in positions that require direct involvement in drug interdiction, that the
incumbent carry firearms, or the handling of “classified” material); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain
Conference Resort, 124 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing an employer’s policy
which required all employees to report their use of prescription drugs and submit to random
drug testing); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the Federal
Aviation Administration requires random drug testing of certain groups of employees);
Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 205-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
a private employer could ask all job applicants to consent to a urinalysis which tests for alcohol
and other drugs as a condition for an offer of employment).
17. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (finding that a
school district may conduct random drug testing of students who participate in its athletic
programs).
18. Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d 1041, 1042-44 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
that a county may administer a substance abuse screening inventory and a pen-and-paper
screening test to recovering or recovered drug and alcohol addicts who are applying for the
County’s general assistance program without violating the Americans with Disabilities Act).
See also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 902, 21
U.S.C. § 862(b) (1997) (giving states the power to drug test welfare recipients and sanction
those who test positive).
19. Lane Kelley, Wanted: Drug-Free Tenants, Landlords of Formerly Crime-Ridden
Complex Require Urine Tests, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 1998, at 1A (reporting that Silent
Apartments in Fort Lauderdale now requires drug tests of their tenants); Faye Bowers, Wanted:
Drug-Free Tenant, Must Pass Test: Florida housing complex screens residents for drugs,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 19, 1996, at 3 (reporting that the Congress Park complex
in Lake Worth, Florida is a tax credit project which drug tests prospective tenants and current
tenants upon lease renewal); Angela D. Chatman, Drug Testing of Renters Draws Mixed
Reactions, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 1, 1994, at 9 (reporting that Summerwood Commons in
Cleveland requires applicants to submit to drug tests).
20. Certain people who have a history of drug abuse may fall under the definition of
“individual with a disability.” See infra notes 26, 33, 44 and accompanying text.
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A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197321 prohibits
discrimination against individuals with disabilities participating in
programs or activities that receive federal assistance.22 Many
apartment buildings receive federal assistance in the form of rent
subsidies or tax credits for developers;23 thus, these buildings fall
within the scope of this Act.24
Section 504 defines “individual with a disability”25 to include
individuals with a past history of drug abuse.26 Section 504, however,
21. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1999).
22. Id. § 794(a).
23. Referring in particular to the low-income housing credit. I.R.C. § 42 (1998). This
credit is offered to developers who build income geared towards low-income residents. Id.
24. “Program or activity” covered under this act includes operations of a private
organization that receives government aid or is primarily engaged in the business of providing
services such as housing. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A).
25. Id. § 705(20)(A):
Except as otherwise provided . . . the term “individual with a disability” means any
individual who . . .
(i)  has a physical or mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or
results in a substantial impediment to employment; and
(ii) can benefit in terms of an employment outcome from vocational rehabilitation
services provided pursuant to subchapter I [29 U.S.C. § 720 et seq.], III [29 U.S.C.
§ 771 et seq.], or VI [29 U.S.C. § 795 et seq.] of this chapter.
Id.
26. Id. § 705(20)(C)(ii):
Nothing . . . shall be construed to exclude as an individual with a disability an
individual who—
(I)  has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(II)  is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in
such use; or
(III) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use;
except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter [29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.] for a
covered entity to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but
not limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in subclause
(I) or (II) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
Id.
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does not protect individuals who are presently using drugs.27
Therefore, entities may drug test individuals to determine whether or
not they are presently using drugs.28
B. The Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act (FHA)29 prohibits disability discrimination
with respect to rental housing.30 The FHA uses a slightly different
definition of a disability than the Rehabilitation Act,31 but the FHA
still specifically prohibits current illegal drug use32 and recognizes
past drug use as a disability.33
Three exceptions to the FHA’s prohibition against disability
discrimination exist. First, the FHA specifically excludes current
illegal use of a controlled substance from the definition of
“disability.”34 Second, the FHA does not require that a dwelling be
27. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) refers to the definition in § 706(20) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 705(20) (1999). “For purposes of subchapter V of this chapter [29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.], the
term ‘individual with a disability’ does not include an individual who is currently engaging in
the illegal use of drugs, when a covered entity acts on the basis of such use.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 705(20)(C)(i).
28. Id. § 705(20)(C)(ii).
29. Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994). In 1988, Congress passed the Fair
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), which expanded the coverage of the Fair Housing Act to
include people with disabilities.
30. Id. § 3604. The FHA is applicable to all dwellings receiving federal assistance except,
under limited circumstances, a single family house that is sold or rented by an owner who is not
in the business of selling or renting dwellings. Id. § 3603.
31. Id. § 3602(h):
“Handicap” means, with respect to a person –
(1)  a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person’s major life activities,
(2)  a record of having such an impairment, or
(3)  being regarded as having such an impairment,
but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).
Id.
32. Id.
33. See United States v. Southern Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that “recovering addicts” with a one year record of sobriety qualify as disabled under
the FHA).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h): “[B]ut such term does not include current, illegal use of or
addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).” See also Southern
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/15
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made available to an individual who may be a risk to other tenants or
their property.35 Third, nothing in the FHA prohibits conduct against
a person who has been convicted of manufacturing or distributing a
controlled substance.36
C. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198837 expands the ability to deny
benefits to drug users. The Act seeks to prohibit the manufacture,
distribution, and illegal use of drugs.38 Accordingly, the Act denies
federal benefits to convicted drug possessors for up to one year, to
first-time drug traffickers for up to five years, and to third-time
traffickers permanently.39 Deniable benefits include grants, contracts,
loans, and professional or commercial licenses but exclude welfare
and public housing.40 A public housing tenant, however, is eligible
for eviction if the tenant, a member of the tenant’s household, or “a
guest or other person under the tenant’s control” is involved in “drug-
related criminal activity.”41
D. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)42 to
provide broad protection for individuals with disabilities.43 The Act
prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a
disability because of that disability. The term “disability” includes
past drug use44 but excludes current drug use.45 The ADA protects
Mgmt., 955 F.2d at 922-23.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9).
36. Id. § 3607(b)(4).
37. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
38. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 preamble, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 862 (1997).
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(l)(5) (1994).
42. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1997).
43. Id. § 12101(b).
44. Id. § 12210(b):
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as an individual
with a disability an individual who-
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those who either participate in or have successfully completed a
supervised drug rehabilitation program and who no longer engage in
illegal drug use.46
Although the ADA does not specifically discuss inquiries made
regarding housing tenants, it does discuss inquiries made regarding
employees. The ADA prohibits disability-related inquiries regarding
employees,47 for example, inquiries into past drug use. The ADA
does not prohibit, however, inquiry into current drug use.48 Inquiries
must be made in a manner that does not require an individual to
provide information that is likely to reveal a disability.49
(1)  has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2)  is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in
such use; or
(3)  is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use;
except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a covered entity to adopt or
administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug testing,
designed to ensure that an individual described in paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer
engaging in the illegal use of drugs; however, nothing in this section shall be construed
to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the conducting of testing for the illegal use
of drugs.
Id.
45. Id. § 12210(a). “[T]he term ‘individual with a disability’ does not include an
individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs. . ..” Id.
46. Id. § 12210(b).
47. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A). A covered entity may inquire into the nature or severity of a
disability if it is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. Id.
48. The ADA allows for the “adopt[ion] or administ[ration of] reasonable policies or
procedures, including but not limited to drug testing.” Id. § 12114(b). The ADA also does not
prohibit requiring those with a history of addiction to submit to more frequent testing than other
employees. See Buckley v. Consolidated Edison, 155 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that
the employer administered generally accepted substance-abuse urine tests to employees
identified as “former substance abusers” more frequently than it did to other employees).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). An applicant can be subjected to a drug test, but the
employer cannot be provided information regarding the employee’s current medications absent
business necessity and job-related reasons. See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort,
920 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (D. Colo. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)), modified, 124
F.3d 1221, 1237 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the employer could not require employees to
disclose the legal prescription medication that they use absent a showing of business necessity).
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E. Housing And Urban Development Regulations
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
established regulations regarding the type of inquiries that a public
housing authority can make of prospective tenants.50 Although these
regulations specifically exclude certain landlords,51 such as those who
provide Section 8 housing to the elderly,52 these regulations do give
landlords guidance as to the elements of a permissible inquiry.
These regulations prohibit any inquiry into the existence or degree
of a disability of an applicant for a dwelling or any person intending
to reside in the dwelling.53 However, landlords may inquire as to
whether an applicant is a current illegal drug user54 or has been
convicted of manufacturing or distributing an illegal controlled
substance if they ask all applicants, regardless of whether or not they
have a disability.55
The HUD regulations also require that “[a]dequate procedures” be
developed to verify applicant information.56 Suggested sources of
information include drug treatment centers, clinics, and physicians, if
warranted.57
F. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996
The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996
(“Extension Act”)58 provides guidelines for determining eligibility for
assisted housing.59 The Extension Act requires that public-housing
authorities take steps to prevent individuals from receiving public
housing assistance if their past drug use or alcohol abuse may
interfere with the health, safety, or peaceful enjoyment of the
50. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (1993).
51. Id. § 100.10(a).
52. Id. § 100.10(b).
53. Id. § 100.202(c).
54. Id. § 100.202(c)(4).
55. Id. § 100.202(c)(5).
56. Id. § 960.206(a).
57. Id. § 960.206(b).
58. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat.
834 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a)-(d) (1998).
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property by other residents.60
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently
reviewed a case in which a public-housing authority rejected an
applicant because of his past drug use. In Campbell v. Minneapolis
Public Housing Authority, the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority
(MPHA) denied Campbell’s application for housing61 based upon his
answers to the application questions, a letter of reference that
mentioned his past drug use, and medical information obtained
pursuant to a release form.62 Campbell challenged the denial,
claiming that his past drug addiction is a protected disability.63
The court held that the Housing Opportunity Program Extension
Act of 1996 supersedes the federal, state, and local statutes and
regulations upon which Campbell relies.64 The court concluded that
the phrase, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” signals
that the Extension Act supersedes other statutes that might conflict
with the Act.65 Therefore, the court reasoned that it did not need to
60. Id. § 1437n(e)(1)(A). This statute was repealed Pub. L. 105-276, tit. V, § 576(a)(2)
(Oct. 21, 1998).
61. Campbell v. Minneapolis Public Housing Authority, 168 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir.
1999).
62. The MPHA’s application included the following question (Question 7): “Have you or
any member of your family intending to live with you in public housing EVER been in a
detoxification center or a chemical dependency treatment program? . . . If yes, where?” Id. at
1071 (citing Appellants’ App. at 48, Campbell v. MPHA, 175 F.R.D. 531 (D. Minn. 1997). The
MPHA also required applicants to sign a release form, allowing the MPHA to obtain
“[t]reatment summaries, program involvements, case plans, and detox admissions” from the
Hennepin County community Services Chemical Health Division. Id.
63. Id. at 1072. The MPHA argued that its inquiries were permissible under the Housing
Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 (“Extension Act”), 110 Stat. 834, 837-38 (1996)
(codified at U.S.C. § 1437n(1)(e) (West Supp. 1998)). Id. This Act “requires public-housing
authorities to take steps to prevent persons with a history of illegal drug use or alcohol abuse
from receiving public housing assistance if the drug use or alcohol abuse ‘may interfere with
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents of the
project.’” Id. at 1073 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998)).
64. Id. at 1074. The court referred to Section 9 of the Extension Act (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1437n(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998)). Id. at 1074-75. Campbell claimed that his
disability was protected under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619 (1994); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (1994); the United States
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437-1437ff (1994); federal regulations implementing these statutory
provisions; the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363.03 subd. 4 (1996); and the
Minneapolis Civil Rights Ordinance, Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances tit. 7, § 139
(1991). Id. at 1072.
65. Id. at 1075 (quoting Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993) (“As we
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consider the interaction between section 9 of the Extension Act and
the various anti-discrimination provisions that Campbell claims the
MPHA violated.66 This case was decided by a court of appeals;
therefore, there is a possibility that the Supreme Court may rule that
the Extension Act does not supersede the various anti-discrimination
provisions.
G. Quality Housing And Work Responsibility Act of 1998
Congress amended section 1437n of the Extension Act on October
21, 1998.67 The new Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act
of 1998 became effective October 1, 1999.68 The Act allows public
housing agencies to require that public housing applicants sign a
written consent.69 The consent authorizes the agency to inquire
whether a drug abuse treatment facility has reasonable cause to
believe that an applicant is currently using a controlled substance
illegally.70 In addition, tenants who have been evicted from public
housing will not be eligible for federally assisted housing for three
years from the eviction date.71
have noted previously in construing statutes, the use of such a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly
signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override the
conflicting provisions of any other section.”); Schneider v. United States, 27 F.3d 1327, 1331-
32 (8th Cir. 1994) (enforcing the plain language of a similar “notwithstanding” clause), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1077 (1995). The Extension Act seeks to free public housing from the scourge
of illegal drug use and alcohol abuse. According to the Act, the MPHA may pursue this
congressional mandate without regard to whether its actions comply with other state or federal
statutes. Id.
66. Id.
67. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 501,
1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.) 2518 (1998), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1998).
68. Id. § 503.
69. Id. § 575(u)(1)-(2).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 576(a). This provision may be waived if the tenant has successfully completed a
rehabilitation program approved by the public housing agency. Id.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT’S VIEW OF SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING
Suspicionless drug testing of tenants prior to signing a lease
enables landlords to protect themselves, as well as their tenants, from
drug related problems.72 However, drug testing gives rise to a number
of constitutional issues. For example, the Fourth Amendment
guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures.73 A search is “unreasonable” if it is conducted without a
warrant that is based on probable cause.74 In recent years the Court
has carved out numerous exceptions to this requirement75 and has
72. Suspicionless drug testing of all tenants necessitates screening out the problem-tenants
before they have an opportunity to move into the building. Drug testing tenants after they have
entered into a lease will not solve the problem. Once a problem tenant has entered the building,
everybody may be at risk. Other tenants may face dangerous criminal activity, and the landlord
may face costly sanctions and liability.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The guarantees of the Fourth Amendment apply to the federal government and government
employers. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (holding that searches and
seizures by government employers or supervisors of the private property of their employees are
subject to the Fourth Amendment). The guarantees do not apply to a private party who initiates
a search or seizure. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by a private party only if the party acted
as an instrument of the Government). See also Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr.
194, 205-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that Matthew Bender, a private employer, did not
violate Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, which declares that privacy is among
the people’s “inalienable rights,” by requiring pre-employment drug testing because the
applicants had notice of the drug testing policy, the samples were collected during a regular pre-
employment physical examination under conditions designed to minimize intrusiveness, and
access to the test results were restricted).
74. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (internal citations omitted).
“Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful . . . [and] per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
75. “Exceptions have been made for investigatory detention, warrantless arrests, seizure
of items in plain view, consent searches, exigent circumstances, searches of containers,
inventory searches, border searches, administrative searches, searches at sea, and special
needs.” Nathan A. Brown, Recent Development, Reining in the National Drug Testing
Epidemic Chandler v. Miller, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 253, 255 n.14 (1998) (citing to Greg
Knopp et al., Project, Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 GEO. L.J. 665, 692 (1995)); see also Silas
J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking of the Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257
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adopted a more flexible standard. This new standard of
reasonableness balances individual interests against governmental
interests.76
The Fourteenth Amendment also protects against deprivation of
“life, liberty, or property” without due process of law.77 The Supreme
Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee
extends to searches and seizures by state officers78 and public school
officials.79 The current trend, however, is to use a balancing-of-
interests approach similar to the one applied in “reasonableness”
inquiries.
A. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of drug testing railroad personnel
involved in train accidents, regardless of suspected drug use.80 The
Court first decided that the Fourth Amendment applied because
government endorsement and participation were extensive enough to
(1984) (analyzing the movement away from the requirements of a warrant and probable cause
in favor of a general standard of reasonableness).
76. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See also, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying a balancing test to validate frisking a
person suspected of being armed and dangerous) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court of the City
and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)). In Camara, the Court validated the
issuance of search warrants for civil inspections by balancing the government’s need for the
search against the invasion of privacy that the search entails. Id.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
78. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) (extending the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures to searches conducted by
state law enforcement officers) (internal citations omitted).
79. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-36 (1985) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to public school officials because they are representatives of the State).
80. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989). The
respondents’ claims for an injunction were denied and the Court held that the regulations did
not violate the Fourth Amendment ban against unreasonable searches. Id. at 634.
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make any private actor who complied with the Federal Railroad
Administration’s (FRA’s) regulations an agent or instrument of the
government.81 Furthermore, the Court considered the FRA’s tests
“searches” under the Fourth Amendment.82
The Court then discussed the reasonableness of the search. In
determining “reasonableness,” the Court balanced the burden of
infringing upon employees Fourth Amendment rights against the
Government’s interest in conducting the search. The Court held that
the importance of the Government’s interest in ensuring railroad
safety outweighed the intrusion on employees’ privacy.83 The
majority dispensed with the usual Fourth Amendment requirements
of warrant, probable cause, and reasonable suspicion.84 The Court
reasoned that no warrant was necessary because a “special needs”85
circumstance was present.86
Although courts generally continue to require reasonable
suspicion even when a warrant is not required,87 the Court
circumvented the probable cause or reasonable suspicion
requirement88 in this case because the employees worked in a highly
regulated industry89 and the procedures for collecting urine were
nonintrusive.90 According to the Court, these factors diminish the
81. Id. at 614.
82. The Court found that blood and breath tests clearly constituted searches. Id. at 616-17.
Urine tests, although lacking the invasiveness of surgical procedures, were also deemed
searches that intruded upon reasonable societal expectations of privacy. Id. at 617.
83. Id. at 631-32.
84. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34. The requirement of a warrant has been frequently waived
where the intrusion was narrowly limited in its objective and scope. Id. at 621-22. The
Government will also waive the warrant requirement when “the burden of obtaining a warrant
[was] likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.” Id. at 623 (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)). The Skinner Court
was concerned that the delay caused by having to procure a warrant would result in the
destruction of valuable evidence because alcohol and drugs might be eliminated from the
bloodstream before a warrant is obtained. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623.
85. Id. at 620. For a discussion of the evolution of “special needs” exceptions, see id. at
637-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 634.
87. Id. at 624.
88. Id.
89. The privacy expectations of the tested employees were diminished by the fact that
they worked in an industry that is highly regulated by the federal and state governments to
ensure safety. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627-28.
90. The regulations governing the collection of the urine necessary for the drug tests
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employees’ expectations of privacy, especially where the concern is
industry safety.91 The Court relied on the FRA’s argument that an
employee’s drug impairment may not be otherwise detectable;
therefore, a drug test affords the only effective method of discovering
drug use.92
B. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the random drug testing of
federal customs officers who carry firearms or who are involved in
drug interdiction.93 After applying the Fourth Amendment’s
balancing test, the Court held that the government’s need to conduct
suspicionless searches outweighed the privacy interests of employees
engaged directly in drug interdiction or employees required to carry
firearms.94
Like Skinner, the Court found only a slight intrusion upon
employees’ privacy interests.95 The Von Raab Court reasoned that the
employees should have an increased expectation of inquiries into
their fitness and probity because of the nature of their job.96
further reduced the intrusiveness of the collection process by requiring that the samples be
furnished in a medical environment without direct observation. Id. at 626-27. However, Justice
Marshall, in his dissent, suggested that compelling a person to produce a urine sample on
demand intrudes deeply on both privacy and bodily integrity. Id. at 645-47.
91. Id. at 627.
92. Id. at 628-30.
93. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
94. Id. at 668. The Court stressed the important role that the Customs Service provides in
fighting the national drug problem. Id. The government has a “compelling interest” to ensure
that these employees are “physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment.” Id. at
670. The public should not be put at risk by employees who are impaired by drug use and are in
positions where deadly force is sometimes utilized. Id. at 670-71.
95. The employees were given advance notice of the urinalysis test. Id. at 661. Upon
reporting for the test, which was conducted by an independent contractor, the employees were
asked to remove only outer garments and personal belongings. Id. The employees had the
choice of producing the sample behind a partition or in a bathroom stall while monitors, who
were the same sex as the employees, remained within close proximity to listen for the normal
sounds of urination. Id. In addition, “dye [was] added to the toilet water to prevent the
employee[s] from using the water to adulterate the sample.” Id. By only testing certain groups
of employees and giving those employees advance notice of the drug test, government officials
ensured that the intrusion upon an individual’s privacy was minimized. Id. at 672 n.2.
96. Id. at 672.
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Moreover, the intrusion was slight because the urine samples could
be examined only for specified drugs, not other substances.97
Furthermore, the employees were not required to disclose personal
medical information to the government unless their test results were
positive.98 In this situation the Court determined that a warrant was
not required under the Fourth Amendment.99 A warrant would
provide little, if any, additional protection of an employee’s privacy
interest because the program was narrowly defined and well known
to affected employees.100
In Skinner and Von Raab, the Court developed the “compelling
need” test for balancing privacy interests against governmental
interests. According to this test, if the government has a “compelling
need” to conduct drug tests, and that need outweighs a person’s
privacy interests, then the drug test is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.
However, it is important to note a major difference between
Skinner and Von Raab.101 The holding in Skinner was based, at least
in part, on the fact that the FRA produced data linking drug and
alcohol use to serious train accidents.102 The testing scheme in
Skinner addressed a substantiated menace to public safety. In
contrast, Von Raab dealt with only slight evidence of both drug use
and harmful incidents resulting from employee drug use.103 The
compelling governmental interest identified by the Court in Von
Raab was not to rid the United States Customs Service of drug users
97. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673 n.2.
98. Id. at 673 n.2.
99. Id. at 666.
100. Id. at 667.
101. This difference was addressed in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 680. Scalia,
with whom Stevens joined, dissented because neither frequency of drug use nor the connection
of drugs to the harm was demonstrated. Id. at 681.
102. The opinion begins with a discussion of the proven incidence of alcohol and drug
abuse among railroad employees involved in serious accidents. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-08. In
addition, Justice Scalia admitted that he joined the majority because the FRA data linked
substance abuse to train accidents. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673. The majority admitted that only five of 3,600 customs
employees tested positive for drugs. Id. The dissent also mentioned the paucity of this data and
the nonexistent connection between drug use and harm. Id. at 682-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The majority answered this objection by comparing the Customs Service testing program to
suspicionless searches of passengers and carry-on luggage at airports, where searches are
justifiably undertaken to prevent possible harm. Id. at 675 n.3.
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who caused serious problems in the past.104 The Government’s
interest was to prevent the United States Customs Service from
promoting drug users to positions where they might endanger the
lives of citizens or the integrity of our National borders.105 The Court
seemed to only require a showing that the drug testing program was
instituted not to cure a pre-existing harm but to avoid potential,
serious, drug-related harms.
C. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton–The Liberal Approach to
Drug Testing
Based on Skinner and Von Raab, a “compelling need” for a
suspicionless drug testing policy existed only when the government
established that public safety or national security were in danger.106
In its next case dealing with suspicionless drug testing, the Court
moved away from the “compelling need” test and encouraged more
suspicionless drug testing programs.
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a school district’s policy of randomly
drug testing student athletes.107 In determining the “reasonableness”
of a search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court balanced the
intrusion on the student’s Fourth Amendment interests with the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.108
The Court first looked at the nature of the privacy interest
involved.109 The drug testing policy was aimed at children who were
temporarily in the custody of the “State as schoolmaster.”110 The
104. The testing program that was challenged did not drug test all Customs Service
employees. The program only tested those “employees seeking transfer or promotion to
positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction or requiring the incumbent to carry
firearms or to handle ‘classified’ material.” Id. at 656.
105. Id. at 679.
106. See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text (discussing the Skinner and Von Raab
decisions).
107. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
108. Id. at 652-64 (internal citations omitted).
109. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654. “The Fourth Amendment does not protect all subjective
expectations of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as ‘legitimate.’” Id. What
constitutes “legitimate” expectations varies with the context and depends upon whether the
individual asserts the privacy interest at home, at work, in a car, or in a public place. Id.
110. Id. Children who are subject to the guardianship of the school have a diminished
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Court stated that the children’s expectation of privacy was
diminished because they were routinely required to submit to various
physical examinations and vaccinations.111 The student athletes who
were tested had an even lower expectation of privacy than students
who were not athletes because they chose to play sports,112 subjecting
themselves to changing and showering in public school locker rooms
that lack privacy.113
The Court then examined the extent of the intrusion on privacy
interests.114 They concluded that the privacy interest involved in
obtaining the urine samples was “negligible” because the conditions
were similar to those typically found in public restrooms.115
The Court also noted that the drug tests only screened for drug use
and not for other conditions such as epilepsy, pregnancy, or
diabetes.116 Positive test results were disclosed only to a limited
number of school personnel, not law enforcement officials.117 The
Court also followed its decision in Skinner, finding that disclosing
expectation of privacy. Id. at 655-57.
111. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656-57.
112. Id. at 657. The Court suggested that, by voluntarily becoming student athletes, these
students “have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy.” Id. (internal citations omitted). For example, student athletes must submit to a
physical examination prior to their participation in sports. Id. The Court analogized students
who “choose” to participate in sports with adults who “choose” to work in a highly regulated
industry. Id. (internal citations omitted). See also supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text
(noting the Skinner Court’s reasoning that privacy expectations of railroad employees are
diminished by the fact that they work in an industry that is regulated by federal and state
governments); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (noting that when a
firearms dealer chooses to engage in a highly regulated business, he or she does so with the
knowledge that, where specifically authorized by statute, business records, firearms, and
ammunition will be subject to inspection without a warrant).
113. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. The locker rooms lacked individual dressing rooms,
shower heads were “lined up” along one wall with no partitions or curtains, and some toilet
stalls did not have doors. Id.
114. Id. at 658. The extent of intrusion “depends upon the manner in which production of
the urine sample is monitored.” Id. In addition to giving the urine samples, prior to the test
student athletes were required to identify any prescription medications they were taking. Id. at
659.
115. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. Male students produced urine samples at urinals, which
were located along a wall. Id. The students remained fully clothed and were only observed from
behind. Id. Female students produced urine samples in enclosed stalls while a female monitor
stood outside to listen for “sounds of tampering.” Id.
116. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
117. Id. (emphasis in original).
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medications before the urine test was not “a significant invasion of
privacy.”118
The privacy interests of the student athletes were then balanced
against the governmental interest involved.119 In this case the Court
moved away from the “compelling need” test used in Skinner and
Von Raab, adopting a more liberal “important interest” test.120 The
Court stated that the Government’s interest was “important,” if not
“compelling.”121 The Government has an interest in deterring
schoolchildren from using drugs.122
Despite the Court’s decision that drug testing student athletes was
constitutional, the justices warned that in other contexts suspicionless
drug testing may not be constitutional.123 They stressed that the most
significant element of this case was the government’s responsibility
as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to the public school
system.124 The Court had to determine whether a reasonable guardian
and tutor would conduct this search.125 They found that, in this
situation, the searches were reasonable.126 The three dissenting
judges,127 however, found the lack of a “special need” detrimental to
118. Id. at 659 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626, n.7). The Vernonia Court noted that it
has “never indicated that requiring advance disclosure of medications is per se unreasonable.”
Id. Furthermore, the school’s policy did not prohibit students from providing the requested
information in a confidential manner. Id. at 660.
119. Id. at 660-61.
120. Id. at 661:
It is a mistake . . . to think that the phrase “compelling state interest,” in the Fourth
Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern,
so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the question: Is there a
compelling state interest here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest that appears
important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that
show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.
Id. (emphasis in original).
121. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Court characterized the
governmental interest as “compelling.” Id. at 660. In Skinner, the “compelling” interest was in
preventing railroad accidents. Id. In Von Raab, the “compelling” interest was ensuring the
fitness of customs officials who interdict the drug trade and/or carry firearms. Id. at 660-61.
122. Id. at 661-62. Drugs can potentially disrupt the entire educational process. Id. at 662.
Drugs also pose substantial psychological and physical risks to athletes. Id.
123. Id. at 665.
124. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
125. Id. (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)).
126. Id.
127. Justice O’Connor, Justice Stevens, and Justice Souter  dissented. Id. at 666.
Washington University Open Scholarship
221.doc 08/24/00
478 Journal of Law and Policy [Vol. 2:459
this case.128
D. Chandler v. Miller— A Return to the “Special Need” Requirement
In the spring of 1997, the Supreme Court handed down its first
decision opposed to suspicionless drug testing. In Chandler v.
Miller,129 candidates for high office in Georgia challenged the
constitutionality of a statute requiring candidates to submit to and
pass a urinalysis drug test in order to qualify for state office.130 The
Supreme Court held that the required drug test amounted to an
unconstitutional suspicionless search.131
The Court once again balanced the governmental interest against
the individual’s expectation of privacy.132 The search was found to be
relatively noninvasive; furthermore, the testing scheme may have
been upheld if a special need had existed.133 However, based upon
Skinner and Von Raab, the Court found that the Georgia statute did
not meet the “special need” requirement.134
First, the Court did not find any “concrete danger” present to
justify a departure from the Fourth Amendment.135 Second, the Court
128. Id. at 676:
One searches today’s majority opinion in vain for recognition that history and
precedent establish that individualized suspicion is “usually required” under the Fourth
Amendment (regardless of whether a warrant and probable cause are also required)
and that, in the area of intrusive personal searches, the only recognized exception is for
situations in which a suspicion-based scheme would be likely ineffectual. . . Far from
acknowledging anything special about individualized suspicion, the Court treats a
suspicion-based regime as if it were just any run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alternative–
that is, an alternative that officials may bypass if the lesser intrusion, in their
reasonable estimation, is outweighed by policy concerns unrelated to practicability.
Id.
129. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
130. Id. at 310.
131. Id. at 309.
132. Id. at 313-22.
133. Id. at 318. Because the State permitted the candidate to provide a urine specimen in
the office of her private physician and the candidate controlled dissemination of the results, the
Court found that “the State has effectively limited the invasiveness of the testing procedure.” Id.
134. Chandler, 520 U.S. 305, 318.
135. Id. at 318-19. Georgia attempted to justify the statute by stating that it “serves to deter
unlawful drug users from becoming candidates and thus stops them from attaining high state
office.” Id. The Court found no reason why ordinary law enforcement methods would not be
sufficient to apprehend any illicit drug users running for office. Id. at 320. In distinguishing this
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concluded that the governmental need was not “special,” but merely
symbolic.136 The Court emphasized Georgia’s failure to present
evidence of an illicit drug use problem among politicians.137 The
Court contrasted Skinner and Von Raab with Vernonia, where the
demonstrated problem of drug abuse substantiated an assertion of a
“special need” to implement a suspicionless general search
program.138 Third, the Court found that the testing scheme in
Chandler was insufficient to meet its intended objectives.139 The
Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment precludes suspicionless
searches when public safety is not in jeopardy, even if the searches
are conveniently arranged.140
IV. APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS TO HOUSING
SITUATIONS
The present laws regulating landlords do not prohibit the drug
testing of tenants; they merely prohibit discrimination against people
with disabilities.141 “Disability” includes past drug use and addiction
but specifically excludes present drug use.142
Besides excluding the present drug user from protection under the
acts, some of the laws specifically allow drug testing to determine
whether an individual is using drugs.143 The HUD Regulations allow
case from Von Raab, Justice Ginsberg reasoned that Customs Service agents cannot be subject
to day-to-day scrutiny, whereas candidates for elective office “are subject to relentless
scrutiny— by their peers, the public, and the press.” Id. at 321.
136. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
137. Id. at 318.
138. Id. (citing Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662-63 (1995); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606-08 (1989)).
139. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319-22. “In contrast to the effective testing regimes upheld in
Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, Georgia’s certification requirement is not well designed to
identify candidates who violate antidrug laws.” Id. at 319. Under the statute, a candidate could
schedule the test date any time within thirty days of qualifying for a spot on the ballot. Id. at
319-20. Hence, the Court believed that “users of illegal drugs . . . could abstain for a pretest
period sufficient to avoid detection.” Id. at 320.
140. Id. at 323.
141. See supra notes 22-71 and accompanying text (discussing the present state of drug
testing in the housing situation).
142. See supra notes 27, 31, 34, and 45 (defining an individual with a disability and
excluding present drug users from that definition).
143. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (defining “individual with a disability”
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the
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inquiries into tenants’ present drug use.144 Additionally, recent
Housing Acts give public-housing authorities the broad power to
“take steps” necessary to rid housing of drugs.145 The common theme
among these laws is that present illegal drug use is not allowed nor
protected under the law. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act146 allows for the
denial of benefits and eviction of tenants if they, their family, or their
guests are “involved in drug related activity.”147
A landlord has the right to inquire into a tenant’s drug use;
however, the manner of doing so must be constitutional.148 To
determine the constitutionality of drug testing tenants, the court must
apply a balancing test similar to those applied in the Supreme Court
cases. Drug tests, similar to those in Skinner,149 Von Raab,150
Vernonia,151 and Chandler,152 are searches that intrude upon
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990).
144. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. Any inquiries under the HUD
regulations must be asked of everyone indiscriminately.
145. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Housing Opportunity
Program Extension Act of 1996 and the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of
1998).
146. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988).
147. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
148. As stated by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment applies only to drug testing
conducted by government officers or those acting at their discretion. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at
308; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
Therefore, some landlords are free to conduct drug testing without regard for tenants’
constitutional rights. As private entities, these landlords operate housing funded entirely by
private monies without governmental assistance. As decided in Skinner, Fourth Amendment
considerations apply where government endorsement and participation is extensive enough to
make any private actor who complies with regulations an agent or instrument of the
government. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34. The issue of whether or not the housing and landlords
are acting as agents of the government is complex. To determine whether or not State action
and the Fourteenth Amendment applies, a court must investigate the type of governmental
assistance being provided to the housing project as well as the degree of governmental
involvement. Based upon Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, a court would likely find that even housing
funded by the government does not fall under State action claims. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830 (1982) (finding publicly funded private school does not fall under state action).
Furthermore, state regulation of housing, even if extensive and detailed, will not make a
landlord’s actions state action. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). For purposes of the
discussion of drug testing in this article, I assume all entities were acting as agents of the
government.
149. See supra note 82 (blood and breath tests clearly constitute searches).
150. See supra note 95 (urinalysis test constitutes a search).
151. See supra note 114 (urinalysis test constitutes a search).
152. See supra note 133 (urinalysis test constitutes a search).
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reasonable societal expectations of privacy; therefore, the Fourth
Amendment applies.
In the both Skinner and Von Raab, the Courts utilized the
“compelling need” test to determine whether drug tests were
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.153 As these cases note,
the court only needs a showing that the testing program is instituted
to avoid some serious harm that could be drug-related.154 In the
housing situation, this harm exists; therefore, the drug testing of
housing tenants would be upheld under the “compelling need” test.155
In Vernonia the Court moved towards a more liberal balancing
test using “important interests.”156 The Court heavily emphasized,
hwoever, the fact that the individuals drug tested in Vernonia were
schoolchildren, who were subject to the custody of the school.157 The
court cautioned against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing
would be constitutional in other contexts.158
In Chandler the Court held that drug testing will not be upheld in
any case where there is merely an important interest.159 The Chandler
153. See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text (discussing how the Skinner and Von
Raab Courts developed the “compelling need” test).
154. Id.
155. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing congressional findings of drug
problems in housing). The extent of the harm caused by drugs in housing may be a topic of
debate. The seriousness of the harm caused by drugs varies from city to city and not all drug
problems may constitute a serious enough threat to warrant drug testing tenants all over the
country. However, a problem does not need to be shown everywhere there is testing. For
example, in Skinner, the Court noted that the Federal Railroad Administration “pointed to
evidence indicative that on-the-job intoxication was a significant problem in the railroad
industry.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607. “The FRA also found . . . that from 1972 to 1983 ‘the
nation’s railroads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or drug
use’ as a probable cause or contributing factor.” Id. In Skinner, the evidence did not point to a
problem with every train company, merely a problem with the industry as a whole.
156. See supra notes 107-28 and accompanying text (discussing Vernonia and the
“important interests” test). If drug testing tenants would be upheld under the “compelling need”
test, certainly it would withstand the more liberal “important interests” test. The government
has an “important interest” in keeping drugs out of housing and away from peoples’ homes.
157. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
159. The State argued “that unlawful drug use is incompatible with holding high office
because drug use draws into question an official’s judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the
discharge of public functions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines
public confidence and trust in elected officials.”Chandler, 520 U.S. at 306. While these may be
legitimate reasons to keep drug users out of political office, the Court did not uphold the testing
of candidates. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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Court, emphasizing the lack of evidence of a proven drug problem,160
could not rationalize upholding the drug testing of political
candidates.161 In housing situations, however, published
congressional findings illustrate that landlords face drug-related
problems.162 Another issue noted by the Chandler court was that the
proposed testing scheme was insufficient to meet its intended
objectives.163 This problem can arise in the housing context and is
addressed in the next section.
After determining the constitutionality of implementing a drug
testing program, courts look to the program itself by first analyzing
the invasiveness of the search to determine if it is reasonable.164
Although this will be discussed more in the following section, it is
important to note that the testing schemes in all the Supreme Court
cases were found to be reasonable.165 Even in Chandler, where the
drug testing was found to be unconstitutional, the testing scheme was
determined to be reasonable.166
Next, courts determine whether a “special need” warrants the
search. There must be a concrete danger that justifies drug testing. In
many areas, public and other federally assisted low-income housing
suffer from rampant drug related crime.167 This crime not only leads
to violence against tenants, but also to a deterioration of the physical
environment in which the government has a significant financial
investment.168 The Government’s interest in protecting its citizens
160. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
161. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
162. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing Chandler).
164. Some may argue that drug testing invades a more substantial privacy interest in this
case than in the employment context because it occurs within the home and not the workplace.
The invasion of the privacy interest would not occur within the home, but more likely within a
controlled medical environment. Furthermore, tenants voluntarily choose where they will live
and whether or not to apply for housing assistance programs. This is similar to the individuals
in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, who all chose to work in a heavily regulated industry or
chose to play for a team. See supra notes 89, 96, 112 (discussing the employees diminished
expectations of privacy due to working in a highly regulated industry, and the students
diminished expectation of privacy because they chose to be involved with school sports).
165. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
166. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
167. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional findings
relating to crime in public housing).
168. “[T]he increase in drug-related crime not only leads to murders, muggings, and other
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and federally subsidized housing should outweigh the interests of
those being tested.
V. IMPLEMENTING A DRUG TESTING PLAN AND THE PROBLEMS A
LANDLORD WILL FACE
It is not necessary for the government to enact a law requiring
landlords to drug test their tenants.169 The government has made it
clear that it will hold landlords liable for the actions of their
tenants.170 Because the Fourth Amendment only prohibits
“unreasonable” searches and seizures,171 landlords should be free to
choose which projects they will drug test and the level of inquiry
necessary.172
Government agencies and their agents must incorporate due
process procedures when implementing drug testing programs.173
Although this requirement does not extend to the private sector,
incorporating these procedures will help to ensure that the program
identifies only current drug-related offenders and does not
discriminate against any protected individuals.174 As discussed in the
Von Raab decision, samples should be tested only for specified drugs
forms of violence against tenants, but also to a deterioration of the physical environment that
requires substantial government expenditures; . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 11901(4). “[T]he inventory of
public housing units owned, assisted, or operated by public housing agencies, an asset in which
the Federal Government has invested over $90,000,000,000, has traditionally provided rental
housing that is affordable to low-income persons.” See Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 502(a)(2), 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.)
2518, 2520.
169. Landlords’ interests may be better protected if the Government does not enact a law
requiring drug testing because landlords will be less likely to become agents of the government,
who are bound by the U.S. Constitution. See supra note 148 (discussing state action).
170. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (discussing the sanctions and penalties
that landlords may face resulting from the actions of their tenants).
171. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (internal citations omitted). See also United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966). “What is
reasonable, depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
nature of the search or seizure itself.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
537 (1985) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985)).
172. “What is reasonable . . . depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or
seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing to United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
173. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment).
174. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing that private parties are not
restricted by Fourth Amendment guarantees).
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and not other substances.175 The testing program should be designed
narrowly to discover only present drug use, not medical conditions
that are protected as a disability under the law.
Tenants or prospective tenants must not be required to disclose
personal medical information unless their test result comes back
positive.176 Information regarding legally prescribed medications
taken by the individual tested cannot be provided to the entity
requiring the test.177 Therefore, the testing scheme must not disclose
tenants’ medical conditions. For this reason, certain drug screens are
violative of the ADA.178
Although numerous methods exist for detecting illegal drug use,
these methods vary widely in cost and reliability.179 The method
chosen for drug testing tenants should be aimed at revealing present
drug use, while minimizing privacy intrusion. Unfortunately, drug
tests lack 100% accuracy.180 As the popularity of drug testing
increases and the drug testing industry becomes more competitive,
test accuracy declines.181 Furthermore, numerous foods and legal
medications can produce “false positives.”182 If tenants test positive
175. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the testing of urine samples in
Von Raab).
176. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure of personal
medical information). See also note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the Roe v. Cheyenne
Mountain decision).
177. This would exceed the level of inquiry required to determine present drug use and
expose any potential protected disabilities of the test subject.
178. See Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d at 1044 (the testing procedures
disparately impacted recovering and recovered alcohol and drug addicts).
179. KENT HOLTORF, M.D., UR-INE TROUBLE 58 (1998). “Drug testing price quotes range
from $10 to $490 per employee tested.” Id. (citing AJ McBay, Comparison of Urine and Hair
Testing for Drugs of Abuse, J. ANAL. TOXICOL., 19201-04 (1995)).
180. Id. at 59 (internal citations omitted) (discussing the inaccuracies of drug tests).
181. Id. at 57 (citing to AJ. McBay, Drug-Analysis Technology-Pitfalls and Problems of
Drug Testing, 33 CLIN. CHEM. 33B, 33B-40B (1987); M. Caidin, Risks of Random Drug
Testing Aviation Safety, 6-8 (1993); AJ. McBay, Comparison of Urine and Hair Testing for
Drugs of Abuse, 19 J. ANAL. TOXIC. 201-04 (1995)). “Because drug testing has become a very
competitive industry, laboratories are implementing cost cutting measures and attempting to test
increasing numbers of specimens quicker and cheaper, which is causing testing accuracy to
worsen even further.” Id.
182. HOLTORF, supra note 179. A “false positive” is a report that a drug or metabolite has
been detected when a drug or metabolite is not present in the specimen. The following is a list
of illegal drugs and some of the substances which can cause false positives:
1. Marijuana: Advil, Nuprin, Motrin, Bayer Select Pain Relief Formula.
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for drugs, they may be unjustly denied housing opportunities.183
A few courts have chosen to rely on hair analysis testing, stating
that these tests are more reliable than urine and blood tests.184 In
actuality, not only are hair tests poor at identifying current drug
use,185 but they may be racially biased as well.186
2. Amphetamines: Nyquil, Contact, Sudafed, Tavist-D, Dimetapp, Sinex, Actifed,
Afrin.
3. Cocaine: Amoxicillin, tonic water.
4. Opioids: Poppy seeds, Tylenol with codeine, Percocet, Nyquil
5. Barbiturates: Fiorinol for tension headaches, some sleeping pills, Donnatol for
treatment of irritable bowel syndrome and stomach ulcers, antiasthmatic preparations
that contain phenobarbitol, Dilantin.
6. Benzodiazepines: Most prescription sleeping pills and anti-anxiety medication.
7. Lyseric acid diethylamide (LSD): Migraine medication, over-the-counter allergy
preparations, sleep aids, and antinausea medications that contain promethazine:
Phenergan, Promethegan.
Id. at 99-102.
183. If the tenant tests “false positive” and the landlord allows them to move in, this may
have adverse effects on the landlord. If the tenant subsequently commits a crime and the
landlord had knowledge of the tenant’s prior positive drug test, this may increase the landlords
risk for liability. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing landlord liability for
failing to disclose crime risks).
184. See Nevada Employment Security Department v. Holmes, 914 P.2d 611, 615 (Nev.
1996) (concluding that hair testing is now an accepted and reliable scientific methodology for
detecting illicit drug use); United States v. Medina, 749 F. Supp. 59, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(stating that hair testing is “an effective and accurate method of detecting the presence of
various compounds including narcotics”).
185. HOLTORF, supra note 179, at 104. These tests are considered poor at identifying
current drug use because “the maximum amount of drug is deposited one to two months after
drug use and is often not detectable until weeks after use.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Hair
may also be contaminated from such substances such as passive, second-hand marijuana smoke
found at some parties and concerts. Id. at 106.
186. Id. at 104. “Most drugs, including cocaine and marijuana, bind and incorporate into
the hair of African-Americans 10 to 50 times greater than drugs are incorporated into the hair of
caucasians.” (citing to G.L. Henderson et al., Incorporation of Isotopically Labeled Cocaine
and Metabolites into Human Hair: 1. Dose-Response Relationships, 20 J. ANAL. TOXICOL. 1-11
(1996); R.E. Joseph et al., In Vitro Binding Studies of Drugs to Hair: Influence of Melanin and
Lipids on Cocaine Binding to Causoid and Africoid Hair, 20 J. ANAL. TOXICOL. 338, 338-44
(1996); S.J. Green & J.F. Wilson, The Effect of hair Color on the Incorporation of Methadone
into Hair in the Rat, 20 J. ANAL. TOXICOL. 121, 121-23 (1996). Id. “Other studies have also
demonstrated and confirmed the racial bias in hair testing.” (citing to S.J. Green & J.F. Wilson,
The Effect of Hair Color on the Incorporation of Methadone into Hair in the Rat, J. ANAL.
TOXICOL. 121, 121-23 (1996)); S.P. Gygi et al., Incorporation of Codeine and Metabolites into
Hair: Role of Pigmentation, DRUG METAB DISPOS 495, 495-501 (1996); N.H. Slawson, et al.,
Quantitative Determination of Phencyclidine in Pigmented and Nonpigmented Hair by Ion-
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In addition to the racial problems associated with drug testing,
drug users may avoid detection. Assuming drug users know about the
impending test, they may choose to abstain from drug use for the
minimum time period necessary to cleanse their systems.187 They
may also choose to take cleansing formulae designed to remove
traces of drugs from their systems.188
Finally, to implement a suspicionless drug testing policy, a
landlord must test all tenants of a particular building, not just select
individuals.189 This will raise the issue of whether landlords may
single out particular buildings and projects, instead of testing all of
their buildings and projects. Some tenants in expensive, luxury
apartments may not be willing to submit to drug testing, even if they
are not drug users. Moreover, landlords are more concerned with
testing tenants in high crime areas than those who reside in
expensive, luxury apartments. If a landlord tests only buildings in
areas where drug use is prevalent, there may be discrimination
challenges.190 Although it is unlikely that discrimination claims
would be justified, landlords must consider this issue.191
The drug testing issues also arise in the corporate housing context
when a company rents an apartment to one of its employees. When a
landlord requires that the tenants undergo drug testing it is essentially
the same as a company requiring its employees to undergo drug
testing, which may involve a separate balancing test.192
Trap Mass Spectrometry, 20 J. ANAL. TOXICOL. 350, 350-54 (1996)). Id. at 105.
187. For a discussion of various methods for avoiding detection of drug tests see HOLTORF,
supra note 178, at 111-24.
188. Id.
189. See supra note 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing the HUD regulations that
govern inquiries made of tenants).
190. Some public housing projects subjected to testing may be predominantly populated by
residents of minority races.
191. Although racially disproportionate impact is relevant, it is not the sole factor in a
racial discrimination case. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.” Metropolitan Housing Development, 429 U.S. at 265.
192. The employer would have to require that the employee undergo drug testing so that
they may live in the housing. However, if this employee is the only employee living in the
housing, then they are the only employee who is drug tested. An employer cannot require a
medicial examination or inquire whether the employee has a disability unless it is job-related
and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). There would have to be a
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VI. CONCLUSION
If landlords are expected to take a proactive role in policing their
properties, then they must have the power to perform this task. Under
the present laws, landlords have the right to drug test tenants. Drug
testing enables landlords to provide a safer environment by
alleviating several risks. Although the tests are not 100% accurate,
the technology will, in all likelihood, improve over time.
However, one of the basic tenets of this country’s judicial system
is the proposition that a person is “innocent until proven guilty.” By
allowing suspicionless drug testing, the presumption shifts closer to
“guilty until proven innocent.” That is, all individuals are assumed to
be using drugs until a negative drug test proves that they are not.
Perhaps a better solution is to reduce landlords’ liability for their
tenants’ activities and hold everyone accountable for his or her own
actions.
determination into whether the living arrangement is a “business necessity.”
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